Concept of Tolerance

MS-SEA Reading Group Discussion – Interrogating the Concept of Tolerance in Indonesia
11 June 2020, 4 to 6 pm
By Alex Arifianto, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

The reading group discussed the concept of “tolerance” as used in two papers on Indonesia: Jeremy Menchik’s “Godly Nationalism in Indonesia” & Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi’s “The Myth of Pluralism within Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama”. Please find below some of the key points from the two papers that were raised by Alex prior to the group discussion.

“Godly Nationalism in Indonesia” by Jeremy Menchik (2014)

  • “Godly nationalism” is conceptualized originally from Indonesia’s national ideology Pancasila – which is neither secular nor theocratic, but expects all Indonesians to have a belief in one monotheistic deity (broadly defined) in order to be judged by the state as “good citizens.” Menchik then adopts it as a potentially generalizable concept to explain state-religion relations in other countries (India, Eastern Europe, and the United States).
  • Menchik’s definition of tolerance is not found in the article. It is found in his book (Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, Cambridge UP, 2016, p. 19): “the willingness to put up with those things one rejects or opposes.” Menchik’s definition of tolerance is much broader than the definition adopted by Miezner and Muhtadi.
  • The main issue of the article is that while Menchik stated that acts of intolerance by Indonesian Islamic groups ebb and flow under different time periods and contexts (Islam and Democracy, p. 19), he argued in the article that their intolerance against the Ahmadis have been consistent through different periods and political contexts, contradicting his earlier argument.
  • In reality, some NU and Muhammadiyah activists do express tolerance toward the Ahmadis even though both organizations formally have condemned the Ahmadis as a heretical sect. For instance, Ahmadis in Surabaya have had good relations with local NU clerics for decades and the latter defended the group when it was attacked by the Islamist-leaning Islamic Defenders Network (FPI) around 2010.
  • Menchik might have confused “tolerance” with “orthodoxy” in his research, since his data on NU and Muhammadiyah’s intolerance against the group were based on formal pronouncements and statements issued by these groups leaders against the Ahmadis in a period of nearly one century. In reality NU and Muhammadiyah members have much more tolerant attitudes and willing to defend Ahmadis when they were persecuted during the 2000s and 2010s.
  • Like his account on intolerance, Menchik’s interpretation of godly nationalism/Pancasila is also fixed and formalized, while in reality, Pancasila is conceptualized and politicized under different time periods and political regimes. His characterization of Pancasila as “godly nationalism” is only valid if you examine it from today’s contexts but not so much if you look at it from the 1960s to 1980s. Under Sukarno and early Suharto period – when both regimes promoted nationalism to counter the narratives of conservative Islamist groups, Pancasila was associated more with secular nationalism rather than godly nationalism. Hence, concepts are not fixed in time and depends on their contexts in a given time period.
  • In conclusion, Menchik’s attention toward concepts like (in)tolerance and godly nationalism – and his assertion that they are not fixed in stone, are contradicted by his empirical accounts which treat these concepts as more static entities.

“Myth of Pluralism in Nahdlatul Ulama” by Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi (2020)

  • Because of the study’s neo-positivist epistemology and quantitative research design, it adopts a much more precise definition of tolerance: “an attitude that is accepting of the values and practices of citizens endorsing a faith different from one’s own and that views the constitutional rights of such citizens as equal to those held by followers of one’s own faith.” Its definition of intolerance is basically the inverse.
  • While the authors claimed that the above definition “does not fall into the trap of applying Western standards to a non-Western context,” in reality it is rooted in liberal political theory as expressed by philosophers like John Locke, John Rawls, and Jurgen Habermas – all Western-based, so one may question whether this claim is indeed valid.
  • The authors employed quantitative methodology and public opinion survey data to proof their claim that unlike the image projected by its leaders and prominent activists, members of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) – Indonesia’s largest Islamic group – are not tolerant at all. Their level of intolerance against religious minorities – operationalized in the survey as Christians – is roughly similar to that of Indonesian Muslims in general.
  • The main issue of the article is that given how the survey sample is constructed, most of the NU members sampled are rank-and-file members who followed the group’s doctrine and ritualistic practices but not necessarily participating in everyday activities and having knowledge similar to its leaders. Indonesian scholars always cautioned about the viewpoints and positions expressed by NU leaders/elites (‘structural NU’) and those of its rank-and-file members (‘cultural NU’). The article seems to ignore such distinctions and adopt a sample largely constructed from the ranks of ‘cultural NU.’
  • The article also claims a direct relationship between the teachings and exhortations made by NU leaders/clerics with those of its rank-and-file members. In reality, their authority is historically decentralized – and it is becoming more fragmented – with the arrival of new Islamist groups competing against the NU as well as popular Islamist online preachers who have commanded followers from millions of Indonesians (including NU members). Hence, one cannot claim a direct relationship between what NU leaders said and what their followers chose to follow – as the latter’s views might be influenced by other non-NU groups and preachers as well.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *